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MORALISTIC LIBERALISM AND 
LEGAL MORALISM 
Robert P. George* 
HARMLESS WRONGDOING: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW. By Joel Feinberg. New York: Oxford University Press. 1988. 
Pp. xxii, 380. $32.50. 
What may the criminal law legitimately do about vices that do not 
directly harm anyone not engaging in, or consenting to, them? In 
Harmless Wrongdoing, Joel Feinberg1 defends what has become the 
orthodox liberal answer to this question, namely, that the law may 
take (limited) steps to prevent offense to nonconsenting parties, but 
may not forbid consenting parties from engaging in victimless 
immoralities. 
Harmless Wrongdoing is the final installment in Feinberg's four-
volume series, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. 2 Like the three 
volumes that preceded it, it is a model of clear, rigorous, and fair-
minded philosophical argument. Feinberg carefully frames the pro-
positions that he believes must be established if the liberal critique of 
"morals legislation" is to prevail; he defends those propositions by 
stating with particularity the reasons for believing them to be true; and 
he fairly considers any reasons he can think of against them or in favor 
of incompatible alternative propositions. 
Feinberg's overarching goal is to vindicate "the liberal position," 
which he defines as the view that "[t]he harm and offense principles, 
duly clarified and qualified, between them exhaust the class of good 
reasons for criminal prohibitions" (p. xix). The "harm principle" 
states that "[i]t is always a good reason in support of penal legislation 
that it would be effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to 
persons other than the actor (the one prohibited from acting) and 
there is no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost to 
other values" (p. xix). The "offense principle" says that "[i]t is always 
a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it is 
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necessary to prevent serious offense to persons other than the actor 
and would be an effective means to that end if enacted" (p. xix). 
In Offense to Others, an earlier volume in the series, 3 Feinberg re-
jected "the extreme liberal position" that only the harm principle can 
justify criminal prohibitions. That rejection enables him to draw on 
the "offense principle" to support laws that would forbid 
pornographers, for example, from displaying their wares in public 
places. But his "moderate liberalism" nevertheless enables him to op-
pose laws that seriously impede, and a fortiori those that forbid, distri-
bution of even the most sordid pornographic materials. 
In Harmless Wrongdoing, Feinberg warns his readers not to con-
fuse the distinction between "moderate" and "extreme" liberalism 
with the distinction between "cautious" and "bold" liberalism. Cau-
tious liberals hold that "only the harm and offense principles state rea-
sons that are always good and frequently decisive for criminalization, 
while conceding that legal moralism states reasons that are sometimes 
(but rarely) good" (p. 324). Bold liberals believe that "the harm and 
offense principle reasons are not only always good and frequently deci-
sive, but also that they are the only kinds of reasons that are ever good 
or decisive .... " (p. 324). While Feinberg has no interest in defending 
"extreme" liberalism, he did set out to defend a "bold," albeit "moder-
ate," liberalism; and he strenuously attempts to hold on to the bold 
position in the face of criticisms marshaled by opponents of liberalism. 
He admits, however, that "some of the legal moralist's counterexam-
ples [may] prove too difficult to handle satisfactorily." In that case, he 
is willing to retreat to "cautious" liberalism as "the fallback position" 
(p. 324). 
Cautious or bold, Feinberg's liberalism is, by his own reckoning, 
universalistic and, indeed, "dogmatic." Unlike the more circumspect 
liberalism of, say, Joseph Raz,4 Feinberg's liberalism is not meant to 
apply only in modern pluralistic or secular societies. Rather, it is pro-
posed and defended as the one true (political) faith. Although it is in 
many ways a doctrine of tolerance, it is self-consciously intolerant of 
nonliberal cultures. In Harmless Wrongdoing, Feinberg concludes the 
Moral Limits of the Criminal Law series with a stirring declaration on 
precisely this point: "[I]f there is personal sovereignty anywhere, then 
it exists everywhere, in traditional societies as well as in modern plu-
ralistic ones. Liberalism has long been associated with tolerance and 
caution, but about this point it must be brave enough to be dogmatic" 
(p. 338). 
While he defends a "dogmatic" liberalism, Feinberg does not offer 
a dogmatic defense of that liberalism. He does not assume the truth of 
liberalism in advance. He recognizes that "the liberal position" on the 
3. See supra note 2. 
4. See Raz, Liberalism, Skepticism, and Democracy, 14 IOWA L. REv. 761, 785 n.31 (1989). 
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moral limits qf the criminal law is not self-evidently true, and that its 
truth must therefore be established by argument. Despite this recogni-
tion, however, he offers little direct or affirmative argument to estab-
lish its truth. His method is one of dialectical, rather than direct, 
argumentation. He seeks to demonstrate (1) that the liberal position 
can withstand arguments meant to establish its falsity, and (2) that 
alternatives to liberalism suffer debilitating defects. 
In Harm to Self, 5 the third volume in the series, Feinberg indi-
cated that his commitment to liberalism followed in part from his view 
that "personal sovereignty" almost always outweighs considerations 
that support criminalizing behavior that, if it harms anyone, harms 
only parties consenting to it. And, as he reminds his readers in Harm-
less Wrongdoing, in the very first book of the series, Harm to Others, 6 
he concluded that the concept of "moral harm" (or corruption of one-
self) is not a legitimate concern of the law because "[h]arm to charac-
ter ... need not be a setback to one's interests ... and when it is not, it 
cannot be a harm in the primary sense unless the person has a prior 
interest (and again he need not) in the excellence of his character" (p. 
17). 
Feinberg's rejection of the concept of moral harm is important be-
cause the widely shared Aristotelian belief that a morally upright 
character is intrinsically valuable is central to the traditional (and, in 
my view, best) defense of the moral validity of morals laws. The view 
that personal sovereignty almost always outweighs considerations sup-
porting laws that protect the moral environment in which people form 
their characters will seem far less plausible to someone who believes, 
as I do, that a good character is an objective, rather than a mere sub-
jective, interest or value, than it does to Feinberg. Nonetheless, since 
Feinberg's arguments in Harmless Wrongdoing rarely presuppose that 
his readers share his views about personal sovereignty and moral 
harm, I shall not take issue with these views here. 
Feinberg's defense of the liberal position is moralistic: his reasons 
for rejecting morals laws are moral reasons. None of the participants 
in the modem philosophical debate over morals legislation deny that 
the proper scope of the criminal law is limited. No one believes that 
the law can or should enforce every moral obligation. Even Feinberg's 
fiercest opponents acknowledge practical or prudential reasons for re-
stricting the reach of the criminal law. What Feinberg wishes to show 
is that there are compelling moral reasons as well. He insists that laws 
forbidding activities that neither harm nor seriously offend others are 
immoral laws, notwithstanding the immorality of the activities they 
forbid. 
Of course, some liberals argue against morals legislation on the 
5. See supra note 2. 
6. See supra note 2. 
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ground that the activities typically forbidden by morals laws are not 
really immoral. The radical version of this argument appeals to gen-
eral moral subjectivism or relativism. Anyone who has ever attended 
a cocktail party or taught an introductory course in ethics or political 
theory is familiar with the following chain of reasoning: 
(i) All moral views are relative. 
(ii) Thus, no one has the right to impose his view of morality on 
anyone else. 
(iii) Therefore, laws forbidding allegedly immoral activities on the 
ground of their immorality are wrong. 
The glaring defect in the logic of this argument has been pointed out 
by virtually every serious writer on the subject, including Joel Fein-
berg. Propositions (ii) and (iii) express moral judgments. These judg-
ments are either relative or nonrelative. If they are relative, as (i) says 
that all moral judgments are, then there is no reason for someone who 
happens not to share them to revise his view in favor of the liberal 
position. If they are nonrelative, then proposition (i) is false and can-
not provide a valid premise for propositions (ii) and (iii). 
Feinberg makes the point in the form of a warning to his fellow 
liberals: 
The liberal ... had better beware of ethical relativism - or at least of a 
sweeping ethical relativism, for his own theory is committed to a kind of 
absolutism about his favorite values. If his arguments conveniently pre-
suppose ethical relativism in some places yet presuppose its denial else-
where, he is in danger of being hoist with his own petard. [p. 305; 
emphasis in original] 
A less radical version of the relativistic argument for liberalism 
avoids this self-contradiction by affirming the existence of a certain 
class of objective moral judgments while denying that judgments about 
the sorts of activities forbidden by morals laws are within this class. 
Liberals who rely on this argument typically claim, not that all moral 
judgments are relative, but only that moral judgments condemning ac-
tivities that do not harm or unreasonably offend others are relative. 
The relativism of this form of liberalism is what Feinberg might call a 
less "sweeping" form of relativism. 
This form of liberalism identifies as a central nonrelative truth the 
proposition that it is morally wrong - because it violates people's 
rights to autonomy or personal sovereignty - for the law to forbid 
people from doing as they please in matters that concern only them-
selves and their consenting partners. Moral judgments about such 
matters - the very stuff of autonomy or sovereignty - are subjective 
or relative. This form of liberalism identifies the whole of objective 
morality with the morality of interpersonal conduct. It acknowledges 
the existence of objective reasons for action (or forbearance) only 
where the rights or interests of others are at stake. It makes political 
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theory the central concern of moral philosophy, and the requirements 
of justice the sole concern of political theory. 
Feinberg, however, does not wish to argue on the basis of even so 
limited a form of relativism. He boldly suggests that liberal principles 
of political morality ought to be persuasive even to people who believe 
that objective moral norms govern self-regarding, as well as other-re-
garding, conduct. Thus, he is willing to grant, at least for the sake of 
argument, that the activities typically forbidden by morals laws really 
are immoral. The burden of his argument is to show that morals laws 
are seriously wrong even when the moral norms they enforce are ob-
jectively true. 
Thus, Feinberg's liberalism accords the legislator the same role as 
does the liberalism of the moderate relatiyist who denies that there are 
self-regarding immoralities. The task of the conscientious legislator, 
in either form of liberalism, is easier than the traditional moralist 
imagines; for the legislator can exclude some morally controversial ac-
tivities from the domain of criminal prohibition without undertaking 
the daunting task of inquiring into their moral status. The legislator 
need only inquire whether an act or practice proposed as a candidate 
for criminalization is likely to prove harmful or unavoidably offensive 
to nonconsenting parties. Of course, that is often a difficult question 
requiring skill and knowledge in various areas of social (and some-
times natural) science. Consider the question of whether the wide-
spread availability of pornography leads to violence against women. 
Some .competent researchers say "yes," others say "no." A liberal leg-
islator trying to decide on a bill that would restrict the availability of 
pornography would have no easy job in sorting through the evidence 
and deciding which way to vote. But Feinberg's and the moderate 
relativist's liberalism would free him from the additional task of moral 
reflection that would otherwise be imposed on him by the traditional 
moralist who believes that the morality of pornography ought to be 
relevant to the legislator's judgment. 
While declining to identify the whole of objective morality with the 
morality of interpersonal conduct, Feinberg does share with moderate 
relativist liberals a conception of liberalism as a purely political doc-
trine. Unlike competing political doctrines, it is not, nor is it even 
continuous with, a doctrine of personal morality. It says what society, 
or the state, or the criminal law, must do, may do, and may not do. 
Although Feinberg does not deny that there can be objectively true 
judgments of personal morality, his liberalism claims to presuppose no 
particular judgments of personal morality, and is, indeed, meant to be 
consistent with widely divergent views on the moral permissibility of 
the activities typically prohibited by morals laws. 
Although this conception of liberalism as a purely political doc-
trine - in no way dependent upon or continuous with a doctrine of 
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personal morality - is the prevailing view among liberal political phi-
losophers, some contemporary liberals dissent from it. Recently some 
liberal political philosophers have challenged the belief that liberalism 
consists of a "relatively independent body of moral principles, ad-
dressed primarily to the government and constituting a (semi-)autono-
mous political morality."7 These "perfectionist"8 liberals take the 
view that the values and moral principles that govern practical ration-
ality in the area of personal moral judgments are the same as those 
that govern in the area of political judgments. Accordingly, they re-
ject the "anti-perfectionism" of John Rawls and his followers, and 
ground the liberal concern for individual freedom, not in an autono-
mous principle of political morality that directs the state to refrain 
from imposing any controversial conception of human well-being or 
flourishing on individuals who may not share that conception, but 
rather in a distinctively liberal conception of human well-being or 
flourishing.9 Although perfectionist liberals share Feinberg's aversion 
to morals legislation, they typically allow the law greater scope to 
combat vice through noncoercive means than do anti-perfectionist 
liberals. 
Sometimes Feinberg's liberal premises generate conclusions that 
are unacceptable even to those generally favoring a permissive regime 
of criminal law. In most of these cases, he is admirably willing to face 
up to the implications of his fundamental principles and embrace un-
popular conclusions openly. For example, instead of fabricating ad 
hoc reasons to justify widely accepted laws forbidding bigamy and 
usury, Feinberg straightforwardly declares these practices (when en-
gaged in by consenting parties) to be beyond the morally legitimate 
reach of the criminal law (p. 166). 
In most of the cases in which he would permit the legal prohibition 
of acts that in themselves harm no one apart from parties consenting 
to them - consensual dueling and slavery are two examples - he 
7. J. RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM_ 4 (1986). 
8. "Anti-perfectionists" hold that governments are either (i) required to remain neutral on 
controversial questions of what makes for, or detracts from, a morally good life, or (ii) forbidden 
to act on the basis of controversial ideals of moral goodness. They typically defend strict versions 
of the harm principle as an implication of the requirements of governmental neutrality and the 
exclusion of ideals. "Perfectionists" believe that governments may legitimately act on the basis 
of judgments about what is humanly good and morally right, even when these judgments are 
controversial. Traditional moralists are perfectionists. They typically reject the harm principle 
and permit the legal prohibition of some victimless immoralities. But some contemporary liber· 
als are also perfectionists. They reject government neutrality and the exclusion of ideals; but, at 
the same time, they maintain that a due regard for the human good of individual autonomy limits 
the means by which governments may pursue controversial moral ideals. They typically accept a 
version of the harm principle that forbids, or sharply limits, the use of coercive measures to 
combat victimless immoralities. 
9. See generally V. HAKSAR, EQUALITY, LIBERTY, AND PERFECTIONISM (1979); J. RAZ, 
supra note 7; Galston, Liberalism and Public Morality, in LIBERALS ON LIBERALISM 129 (A. 
Damico ed. 1986); Galston, Defending Liberalism, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 621 (1982). 
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makes it clear that the ground for criminalization is purely pragmatic 
and has nothing to do with the wickedness of fighting duels or selling 
oneself into slavery. His sole reason for supporting laws against these 
sorts of immoralities is that there are "insolvable problems of verifying 
voluntariness" (p. 166). His justification, then, for criminalization in 
these areas is to protect nonconsenting parties from being forced into 
fighting duels or slavery. 
Feinberg does, however, identify one or two cases - which he as-
sures us are strictly hypothetical - in which he finds himself unable, 
in good conscience, to oppose the criminalization of verifiably volun-
tary immoralities whose prohibition cannot be justified under an hon-
est application of his liberal principles. An example is a hypothetical 
case originally pr:oposed by Derek Parfit: a couple deliberately act to 
conceive a child at a time when they know the child will be born with 
serious permanent impairments, and when they could have waited a 
month and conceived a child likely to enjoy perfect health. Now, the 
couple's action violates neither the harm nor offense principles; so, 
under a strict application of Feinberg's liberalism, it is, as he admits, 
beyond the morally permissible scope of the criminal law. Neverthe-
less, Feinberg is willing to "carve out a clear categorical exception to 
[his] liberalism" (p. 327) and permit the law to punish the parents for 
their cruelty. While not attempting to hide the fact that he is making 
an exception, he defends his willingness to permit the criminalization 
of such gratuitous cruelty by appealing to the "humane spirit" of liber-
alism. He describes his position as "reluctantly departing from the 
letter of liberalism but not from its spirit" (p. 327). 
In treating arguments against the liberal position or in favor of the 
legal enforcement of morality, Feinberg refrains from distorting his 
opponents' claims or presenting their arguments in an unfairly unfa-
vorable light. He rarely criticizes a view before taking pains to present 
the strongest argument he can muster on its behalf. He does not pre-
tend that the sole alternative to the libertarian permissiveness he es-
pouses is an authoritarian oppression that no honorable critic of 
liberalism would endorse or even tolerate. Nor does he resort toques-
tioning the motives or character of those who do not share his liberal 
faith. In the most ancient and best tradition of philosophy, he treats 
his interlocutors as partners with him in the quest for truth. 
Occasionally, however, he fails, despite a bona fide effort, to under-
stand or adequately represent a nonliberal author, position, or argu-
ment. For instance, at one point, he mistakenly interprets St. Thomas 
Aquinas as an opponent of victimless crimes and thus as someone who 
subscribed to the liberal position on the moral limits of the criminal 
law. What Aquinas actually held in his famous discussion about 
whether human law should repress all vices, is that the law should be 
concerned mainly with those vices that cause harm to others. He did 
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not hold the view that the law must, as a matter of principle, refrain 
from prohibiting victimless immoralities. Thus, he did not subscribe 
to the liberal position. 10 In fact, Aquinas' position, which is the one I 
believe to be correct, is the position of most defenders of morals legis-
lation, namely, that, while the main concern of the criminal law ought 
to be the prevention of murder, rape, theft, fraud, and the like, the law 
may also legitimately protect the community's moral environment by 
forbidding what James Fitzjames Stephen, the nineteenth-century de-
fender of morals laws, referred to as "the grosser forms of vice." 11 
Elsewhere, in attempting to rebut Ernest Nagel's claim that some 
laws that liberals would justify by reference to the offense principle are 
really morals laws inasmuch as people find the activities they prohibit 
offensive precisely because they consider them to be immoral, 12 Fein-
berg argues: 
[I]f public nudity . . . or public married intercourse are judged immoral 
by most people, it is obviously not because they are thought to be inher-
ently wicked wherever and whenever they occur, but rather precisely 
because they offend those who witness them. In these cases the actions 
are immoral (better "indecent") because they offend; they do not off end 
because they are judged to be, in their essential nature, immoral. Thus 
one can urge their prohibition entirely on the liberal ground of the of-
fense principle, without recourse to legal moralism at all. [pp. 15-16] 
But Feinberg is mistaken in supposing that most people consider pub-
lic nudity or public married intercourse immoral "precisely because 
they offend those who witness them." Moral conservatives, and other 
nonliberals, do, in fact, consider public nudity and public married in-
tercourse to be "inherently wicked" regardless of whether they offend 
anyone. Of course, they do not consider nudity or marital intercourse 
to be inherently wicked. But they do consider public nudity and public 
intercourse to be wicked - even in circumstances where all the mem-
bers of the relevant public hold "sexually liberated" attitudes and are 
therefore unoffended by public nudity and intercourse. Thus, moral 
conservatives consider public nudity immoral even on designated nude 
beaches where, presumably, no one present is in danger of being of-
fended. The reason they consider public nudity immoral - regardless 
of whether it gives offense - is that it is, "in its essential nature," 
immodest. And immodesty is, in their view, immoral. 
At another point, Feinberg ventures to meet a theological argu-
ment that seeks to justify the legal enforcement of morals on the 
ground that all immoralities, including victimless immoralities, are di-
10. T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II, Question 96, Answer 2, Reply. 
11. J.F. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 152 (R.J. White ed. 1967) (2d ed. 
1874). 
12. P. 15 (citing Nagel, The Enforcement of Morals, THE HUMANIST, May/June 1968, at 19, 
26). 
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rect wrongs against God and should therefore be punished. Accord-
ing to Feinberg: 
[T]here ... seems [to be] little point, and no justification, for using the 
resources of the all-too-human political state for such purposes. Just as 
God's authority over human beings must be thought of in highly per-
sonal terms, so must His "retribution." No merely political leader has 
ever made a persuasive claim to speak, qua political leader, for God, and 
the claim to be an instrument of God's highly personal purposes is a 
piece of swaggering presumption, not to say insolent usurpation. If God 
decrees "retribution" for all private acts that are incidentally non-com-
pliant with His own Will, He has his own resources. The human crimi-
nal law is hardly necessary. [p. 163] 
Here Feinberg fails to appreciate, much less credit, the theology of 
those who make the argument he attempts to refute. His theological 
counterargument presupposes an understanding of the relationship be-
tween human and divine causality, and between religious and secular 
authority, that many - perhaps most - religious people simply do 
not share. They believe that there is nothing in principle presumptu-
ous or insolent about trying to be an "instrument of God's highly per-
sonal purposes." According to most theological views, God's mercy is 
as "highly personal" as his judgment; but people who hold these views 
do not believe that that fact absolves human beings from the responsi-
bility to serve as instruments of divine mercy. By her own account, 
Mother Teresa, for example, seeks precisely to serve as such an instru-
ment. Thus, it begs the question to say against the Ayatollah, for in-
stance, that his aspiration to be an instrument of another of God's 
highly personal purposes - namely, his retribution - is "a piece of 
swaggering presumption, not to say insolent usurpation." It is very 
well to observe that "God has his own resources" and therefore has no 
need to employ fallible human institutions like the criminal law. But 
the fact that an omnipotent God could effect his will in other ways 
hardly refutes the claim that he has chosen to effect it through any 
particular agency - even a fallible human agency. After all, God 
could comfort dying beggars without the help of Mother Teresa. But 
many religious people suppose that, in his inscrutable wisdom, he has 
chosen to deliver that comfort precisely through her agency. 
It is, to say the least, unusual to encounter explicitly theological 
argumentation in a work of liberal political theory. Perhaps Fein-
berg's venture into theology is merely a stray bullet. I doubt it, 
though. One of the points that Feinberg wishes to establish is that the 
liberal position on the limits of the criminal law does not depend on 
any particular view of the source or content of judgments of personal 
morality. As I have observed, Feinberg thinks that people holding 
widely varied moral (and, we can now add, religious) views nonethe-
less have reason to subscribe to liberal political views. I doubt, how-
ever, that his position can be sustained. At critical points, one will 
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find Feinberg's rejection of particular morals laws more or less persua-
sive, depending on one's judgments of personal morality. 
Let me give an example of a case in which Feinberg's rejection of a 
morals law clearly depends on a judgment of personal morality widely 
shared by people who happen to be liberals and widely rejected by 
people who hold more traditional ideas. Along with "Parfit's miscon-
ceived baby," Feinberg cites as an especially difficult case for liberal 
opponents of morals legislation Irving Kristol's hypothetical example 
of a "gladiatorial contest[] in Yankee Stadium before [a] consenting 
adult audience ... between well-paid gladiators who are willing to risk 
life or limb for huge stakes" (p. 128). A strict liberal will not want the 
law to prohibit such contests, for there is no victim. Yet, as Feinberg 
says, "[i]t is morally wrong for thousands of observers to experience 
pleasure at the sight of maiming and killing" (p. 139). As in the "mis-
conceived baby case," the "humane spirit" of liberalism seems to be in 
conflict with its "letter." 
Feinberg outlines three possible liberal responses to the gladiatorial 
contests. The one that he considers least satisfactory is the very strat-
egy that worked in the case of dueling and voluntary slavery, namely, 
to support a ban on gladiatorial contests on the ground that it is too 
difficult to ascertain whether the gladiators' participation is voluntary. 
Alternatively, a liberal could support a ban on the ground that the 
gladiatorial spectacle will brutalize the audience and lead to an in-
crease in violent crimes. Thus, a legitimate concern to prevent harm 
to others would provide the rationale for legal prohibition. Of course, 
it might be very difficult to establish that the gladiatorial contests 
would lead to more violence. The difficulty of proving that pornogra-
phy leads to crimes against women may be replicated in the case of the 
gladiatorial contests. 
A third possibility, which Feinberg describes as "a rather uncom-
fortable fallback position for the liberal who wishes to preserve with-
out hypocrisy what he can of his liberal principles in the face of 
Kristol's vivid counterexample" (p. 131), would be to "concede that 
the case is close," but distinguish it from 
the actual examples that people quarrel over: pornographic films, bawdy 
houses, obscene books, homosexuality, prostitution, private gambling, 
soft drugs, and the like, [which] are at most very minor free-floating13 
evils, and at the least, not intuitively evils at all. The liberal can continue 
to oppose legal prohibitions of them, while acknowledging that the 
wildly improbable evils in [Kristol's] hypothetical example[] ... are 
[an]other kettle[] of fish. [p. 131] 
The liberal can, to be sure, support the legal proscription of gladia-
13. A "free-floating" evil, in Feinberg's taxonomy, is an evil that exists independently of its 
effect on anyone's interests. "Free-floating evils" are a subclass of "non-grievance evils,'' that is, 
evils that do not give grounds for personal grievances. For Feinberg's very useful taxonomy of 
evils, see pp. 17-20. 
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torial contests without hypocrisy or inconsistency by modifying his 
position to permit the prohibition of evils that are truly grave. But any 
judgment of the gravity of evils like those involved in gladiatorial spec-
tacles, and any judgment that compares the gravity of these evils to 
the gravity of other evils (like those involved in pornographic films, 
bawdy houses, obscene books, etc.), will be a judgment of personal 
morality, not a judgment one can make on the basis of liberal princi-
ples of political morality. 
While liberals will likely judge the evils of gladiatorial contests to 
be particularly grave, nonliberals are just as likely to judge other evils, 
including some of those on Feinberg's list, to be equally or even more 
serious. Many nonliberals consider the sorts of activities that Feinberg 
assures us are "at most very minor evils" to be at least very serious 
evils. Thus, the very considerations of personal morality that may 
lead Feinberg to favor the banning of gladiatorial contests may lead 
his philosophical opponents to support the criminalization of, say, 
pornography, prostitution, and the recreational use of drugs. 
Liberals may find such judgments bafiling; but traditional moral-
ists do not. Traditional morality takes sexual immorality, for example, 
to be a deadly serious business. Traditional moralists believe that 
there are intrinsically evil acts - including intrinsically evil sexual 
acts - and that these acts disintegrate the individual personality and 
often threaten the integrity of critical human relationships. (In the 
traditional language, they "tend to corrupt and deprave.") Of course, 
traditional moralists might be wrong on these points. Liberals might 
be correct in supposing that sexual immoralities are "at most very mi-
nor evils." But, regardless of which side has the superior understand-
ing of sexual morality and immorality, the point remains that if the 
validity of the liberal position on the moral limits of the criminal law 
depends on a denial that there are intrinsically evil sexual acts, or that 
such acts can be seriously evil, then liberalism is not quite as indepen-
dent of a doctrine of personal morality as Feinberg imagines. 
I shall conclude by considering an argument by which Feinberg 
seeks to show that traditional moralists, who typically subscribe to 
retributivist justifications of criminal punishment, cannot square their 
retributivism with their willingness to criminalize "victimless" immo-
ralities.14 If successful, the argument tells against what I consider to 
be the most plausible alternative to the liberal position. But even if the 
argument ultimately fails, as I think it does, it is nevertheless illumi-
nating. For, to answer Feinberg's argument, the traditional moralist 
must defend a third controversial position in addition to his legal mor-
alism and his retributivism, namely, his belief in a prima facie (defeasi-
ble) moral obligation to obey the law as such. 
14. Feinberg sets out this argument on pages 159-65 of Harmless Wrongdoing under the 
section title " 'Retribution' for wrongs without victims." 
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Retributivism holds that punishment is justified for the sake of re-
storing an order of fairness, particularly in respect of the distribution 
of the benefits (including liberty) and burdens (including sacrifices of 
liberty) of common life, when this order of fairness has been disturbed 
by criminal wrongdoing. For example, a criminal may justly be de-
prived of liberty commensurate with the liberty he wrongfully seized 
in breaking the law. The retributivist wishes the law to maintain a 
state of affairs in which a law-abiding individual, looking back over a 
period of time, will have no reason to consider himself to have been a 
sucker for obeying the law when others were disregarding it with 
abandon. Retributivism thus considers (just) punishment to instanti-
ate - immediately and in itself - the good of justice because it re-
stores the order of fairness. 
Traditional moralists also hold that morals laws may legitimately 
be enacted and enforced for the sake of establishing and maintaining a 
cultural milieu conducive to virtue and inhospitable to vice. And they 
believe that morals offenders may legitimately be punished. To some 
extent, they understand the moral obligations not to engage in the ac-
tivities prohibited by morals laws to be obligations in justice. They 
hold that it is wrong to manufacture or distribute or even purchase 
pornography, for example, not only because such activities are intrin-
sically immoral, but also because one has an obligation to one's fellow 
citizens not to do things that make pornography more widely avail-
able, or acceptable, or that may tempt or induce others to produce or 
distribute or use the stuff. Such an obligation to others is an obligation 
in justice. To the extent that antipornography laws restrict liberty and 
provide for punishment for the sake of preserving and restoring a just 
social order, they present no problem for retributivists. 
Of course, Feinberg, who rejects the very concept of moral harm, 
denies that people have obligations not to corrupt the characters of 
others. So he perceives no injustice in efforts to induce people to use 
pornography, even if pornography does tend to corrupt and deprave. 
But his point against legal moralists here does not depend on joining 
the issue with them over the concept of moral harm. He has noticed 
that the traditional case for enforcing morality does not rest exclu-
sively on an appeal to justice, understood as the restoration and pres-
ervation of an order of fairness (or a just social order). The traditional 
case has a morally paternalistic dimension as well. But just to the 
extent that the point of a law is paternalistic - and is thus motivated 
by something other than a concern to prevent injustice - punishment 
for breaking that law seems to be unjustifiable. If the point of punish-
ment, according to the retributivist view, is to restore an order of jus-
tice disturbed by criminal wrongdoing, how can punishment be 
justified for an act which in no way disturbed that order? In Fein-
berg's terms: how can there be retribution for crimes without victims? 
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Another way of stating the dispute between liberal and traditional 
moralists is that they disagree about whether there are ever valid rea-
sons other than the prevention of injustice for restricting people's lib-
erty to do as they please. The liberal position is that there are no such 
reasons; traditional moralists, on the other hand, hold that preventing 
people from hurting themselves (physical paternalism) or corrupting 
themselves (moral paternalism) can be valid reasons for restricting lib-
erty. It is important to notice that Feinberg's argument does not as-
sume the liberal position to be true in advance. Rather, it seeks to 
exploit what he takes to be a contradiction between retributivism and 
legal moralism to show that if the traditional moralist wishes to retain 
his view that what justifies punishment is the good of restoring the · 
disrupted order of justice, then he must abandon his view that the law 
may justly criminalize acts that do not disrupt that order. 
To meet Feinberg's argument, the traditional moralist must indeed 
claim that "victimless" crimes involve some injustice. But he need not 
claim that the injustice inheres in the underlying immoralities of the 
victimless class that are prohibited under the criminal law. He can 
claim instead that the morals-law offender's injustice is the breach of a 
duty not to break laws that are not unjust - regardless of whether the 
law is motivated by a concern to prevent injustice and irrespective of 
whether the activity forbidden by the law is unjust. It is the breach of 
the duty not to break laws that are not unjust that is itself unjust and, 
thus, warrants punishment. 
Feinberg's argument overlooks the claim of traditional moralists 
that people have a prima facie moral obligation to obey the laws of a 
basically just society. Traditional moralists understand this obligation 
to be an obligation that every member of the community owes to all 
other members; it is an obligation in justice. They hold that the prima 
facie obligation may be defeated in the case of seriously unjust laws; 
and that it is always defeated when the law requires a citizen to per-
form an unjust or otherwise immoral act. They maintain, however, 
that where the law is not unjust - whether or not its purpose is to 
prevent injustice - it creates a moral obligation, even where no such 
obligation existed prior to the law's enactment. The sheer fact of legis-
lation creates an obligation. People who violate the law breach this 
obligation and disrupt the order of justice. A concern to restore that 
order provides a valid retributive reason for punishment. 
Thus, traditional morality considers punishment justifiable even in 
cases where an act forbidden under the law is neither inherently unjust 
nor intrinsically immoral. Consider, for example, laws based on phys-
ical, rather than moral, paternalism. Riding a motorcycle while not 
wearing a helmet may be dangerous and foolish, but it is neither unjust 
nor otherwise immoral. It may cost the cyclist his life in an accident, 
but it will not harm others or corrupt his own character. (In any 
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event, let us stipulate these things for the sake of argument.) Prior to 
the enactment of a law requiring helmets, cyclists have safety reasons 
to wear helmets; but it would be unjust to punish them for not wearing 
helmets, not only because the principles of the rule of law would for-
bid punishment for a perfectly lawful, even if dangerous and foolish, 
act, but also because the failure to wear a helmet does not disrupt the 
order of justice. But, according to traditional moralists, the situation 
changes the moment a law on the subject goes into force. Where legit-
imate public authority has acted without injustice to remove from pri-
vate judgment the choice of whether to wear a helmet while riding a 
motorcycle, it is unjust for an individual to seize back that choice. 
Someone who does so - who breaks the law - may justly be pun-
ished precisely for the injustice involved in failing to obey a just law. 
Of course, the libertarian critic of paternalism will claim that the 
law's paternalism renders it unjust. But this claim, even if it were true, 
will not restore the force of Feinberg's argument against retribution 
for victimless immoralities. That argument is supposed to show that 
acts which are not unjust in themselves should never be made illegal 
because there can be no valid retributive reason for punishing people 
who commit victimless crimes. The argument cannot, however, as-
sume in advance that people cannot be punished for performing acts 
not in themselves unjust because it is (for some other reason) in princi-
ple wrong to criminalize acts except for the sake of preventing injus-
tices. To make this illicit assumption would be to confuse the issue of 
the proper basis of criminalization with the issue of the legitimacy of 
punishment for violations of a criminal law. 
Feinberg's argument seems to assume that the reason for making 
an act illegal must be the same as the reason for punishing someone 
who commits the illegal act. Traditional moralists do not share this 
assumption. If, as they_ believe, there is a prima facie moral obligation 
to obey the law, and if this obligation is an obligation in justice, then a 
valid retributive reason exists for punishing someone who breaks the 
law, even where the act forbidden by the law is not inherently unjust. 
To salvage his argument against retribution for victimless crimes, 
Feinberg must, therefore, show that traditional morality is mistaken in 
supposing that there is a prima facie obligation to obey the law, or, at 
least, mistaken in supposing that the obligation to obey the law is an 
obligation in justice. 
Even if Feinberg ultimately fails to give compelling reasons for 
traditional moralists to abandon their legal moralism and adopt the 
liberal position, his project can hardly be described as a failure. The 
arguments he marshals against legally prohibiting victimless immorali-
ties are far from trivial; and even their failings are illuminating. More-
over, his able defense of liberalism shows that obituaries generated by 
the recent barrage of criticism of liberal moral and political thought 
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are, at best, premature. Dead traditions of thought do not produce 
achievements on the order of Joel Feinberg's Moral Limits of the 
Criminal Law series. 
